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FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES IN REPLY 
1. On November 18, 2002, the Petitioner/Appellee, Amy Migliore 
("Amy") filed for divorce against the Respondent/Appellant Scott Migliore ("Scott"). 
(Rec. 1-7) 
2. On March 21, 2003, Scott filed a Verified Answer. (Rec. 11-18) 
3. On June 5, 2003, the parties tried mediation, but no contract was 
entered into. The Mediation Agreement provides that any agreement reached is only 
tentative and not binding, unless a contract is entered into by the parties. (Rec. 220) 
4. On October 31, 2003, Scott's attorney Wendy J. Lems, filed a Notice 
of Withdrawal of Counsel. (Rec. 32) 
5. Amy's counsel did not file a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel 
after receiving the Notice of Withdrawal from Scott's attorney, Wendy J. Lems. 
6. On December 4, 2003, Amy's counsel proceeded in the case by 
preparing a Confession of Judgment in Amy's favor. (Rec. 34-36) 
7. Scott never received, or reviewed the Confession of Judgment. He 
was only presented with the last page of the document, which he signed while closing on 
the sale of the parties' residential property. This page, which was presented to Scott, only 
authorized Meridian Title Company to release the proceeds from the sale of their home to 
Amy, Scott only signed the document for tliis limited purpose. He did not realize nor 
was he informed that he was signing a Confession of Judgment in the parties' divorce 
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case.1 (Rec. 59, 158, 181-183). This was all done, after Scott's attorney filed her Notice 
of Withdrawal, and before the filing of any Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel under 
Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
8. On February 27, 2004, still without any notice being filed under Rule 
74, and while Scott was still without counsel, Amy proceeded in the action by filing a 
Motion for Order to Show Cause.(Rec. 37). She also submitted her affidavit, as evidence, 
for the court to consider, in support of her Motion. (Rec. 38-40). 
9. An Order to Show Cause hearing was held before Commissioner 
Susan Bradford on April 8, 2004, still without any Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel 
being filed. Scott, unrepresented by counsel, did not appear. His default was entered and 
the Motion was granted based on Amy's Motion and evidence. (Rec. 44). 
10. After this, still without any Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel 
being filed, a money Judgment was entered against Scott on May 7, 2004, by Judge 
Henriod. This Judgment was based on Scott's failure to appear at the hearing; as well as, 
the evidence presented, and the statements made by counsel. (Rec. 45-46). 
11. In June of 2004, Amy's counsel obtained a Writ of Continuing 
Garnishment. (Rec. 53-54). Scott objected to the Writ of Garnishment, claiming that he 
lrThe page signed by Scott does not have any title, page number, or numbered 
paragraphs. It does not have the number of any court case, or reference to any court case. 
There is no indication that it is to be filed with the court as a confession of judgment in 
their divorce action. (Rec. 36) 
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did not receive, review, or agree to, all the pages contained in the alleged Confession of 
Judgment. (Rec. 59). However, Scott failed to appear at the hearing and the hearing was 
stricken. (Rec. 60). 
12. On August 2, 2004, attorney Wendy J. Lems filed a Notice of Re-
Appearance as Scott's counsel (Rec. 67), and filed a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment 
the same day. (Rec. 61-62). Additionally, she filed a Motion for Extension of Time to 
File a Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Set Aside (Rec. 64-65), which was 
granted. (Rec. 73-74). Attorney Lems then filed a Motion for Additional Extension Due 
to Bankruptcy Filing (Rec. 77-80), which was also granted by the court. (Rec. 83-84). 
13. On March 29, 2005, Ms. Lems filed another Notice of Withdrawal of 
Counsel. (Rec. 97). Although Amy claims that this Notice of Withdrawal was filed 
without leave of court and while the Motion to Set Aside was still pending; there was no 
objection filed to the Notice of Withdrawal by Amy's counsel. 
14. After the filing of Ms. Lems' second Notice of Withdrawal, Amy's 
counsel again did not file a Notice to Appear or Appoint counsel. Rather Amy's counsel 
proceeded with garnishments and supplemental proceedings. (Rec. 99-109). Scott again 
objected to the garnishment and appeared at the garnishment hearing. (Rec. 117). On 
August 9, 2005, Judge Roth denied the motion to set aside garnishment, after having read 
the file, the statements of defendant, the Judgments previously entered, and all of the 
pleadings on file, as well as the evidence presented and statements of counsel. (Rec. 118). 
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15. On November 4, 2005 another Motion and Order in Supplemental 
Proceedings was issued. (Rec. 120). On November 29,2005, Ms. Lems appeared on 
Scott's behalf at the supplemental proceedings and the parties later filed a Stipulated 
Motion to Bifrucate the Divorce, to dissolve the bonds of matrimony and reserve the more 
complex issues of the parties' property division. (Rec. 134). This was granted on April 
17, 2006 (Rec. 123-145), and Bifurcated Findings and Conclusions of Law were entered. 
(Rec. 141-143), with a Bifurcated Decree of Divorce. (Rec. 145). 
16. Ms. Lems filed another Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel on June 12, 
2006. (Rec. 148) Again no Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel was filed by Amy's 
counsel pursuant to Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
17. Another Application for Writ of Execution was filed and a Writ of 
Execution was issued on November 2, 2006. This was served on Scott's employer, Star 
Mountain Construction on November 7,2006. (Rec. 150-156). Scott filed a Request for 
Hearing on the Writ of Garnishment, claiming that, "the signature for the judgment was 
improperly acquired." (Rec. 157-158). 
18. A hearing was held before Judge Faust on February 20, 2007. (Rec. 
171). Judge Faust requested that the parties file additional memoranda and case authority 
regarding the garnishment objection and the Motion to Set Aside Judgment. (Rec. 171). 
19. On March 1, 2007 a Notice of Entry of Appearance was filed by 
F. Kevin Bond of Bond & Call, L.C. and on March 12, 2007, a Memorandum in Support 
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of Motion to Set Aside Judgment was filed (Rec. 174-183), asserting that since Amy 
failed to file a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel before the Confession of Judgment 
was filed and Judgment was entered, such "further proceedings" against Scott were 
improper (Rec. 178); that the Confession of Judgment was invalid since it was not a 
proper settlement for a divorce proceeding, containing no findings of fact or conclusions 
of law; and that there was never a meeting of the minds with Scott on the alleged 
Confession of Judgment, when the last page was signed. (Rec. 181-183). 
20. Scott's new counsel also cited in its memorandum the case of 
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 982 P.2d 586 (Ut.App. 1999) holding that once a notice to 
withdraw is filed with the court, the court has no discretion but to stay any further 
proceedings until opposing counsel has filed the required Notice to Appear or Appoint 
counsel under Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rec. 179). 
21. Amy's counsel responded with a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and in Support of Garnishment (Rec. 202-217), supported 
by an affidavit from Charlet Walk, claiming that she attended the closing on the parties' 
home and that the title officer explained the Confession of Judgment to Scott, mentioned 
some alternatives, and that Scott understood the purpose and nature of the document. 
(Rec, 198-199, fs 21 & 22). 
22. Judge Faust reviewed Scott's objections and the validity of the 
Garnishment as well as the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, based on Scott's new 
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claim that Amy failed to file a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel before proceeding in 
court with the alleged Confession of Judgement, the Order to Show Cause hearing, 
Scott's default and the Judgment entered against Scott, while Scott was unrepresented by 
counsel. (Rec. 271-273). 
23. By Minute Entry, dated April 18, 2007, Judge Faust found that the 
notice provisions of Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to the 
facts in Scott's case. (Rec. 272). Judge Faust ruled that the notice requirement of Rule 74 
was not intended to invalidate contractual agreements; and thus, the alleged Confession of 
Judgment, distinguishes this case from Loporto v. Hoegemann, 982 P.2d 586 (Ut.App. 
1999). (Rec. 271-273). The court, evidently relying on the Affidavit of Charlet Walk, 
further found that Scott was aware and understood the purpose and nature of the 
Confession of Judgment. (Rec. 272). 
24. On May 17, 2007, within 30 days from the trial court's April 18, 
2007 Minute Entry, denying Scott's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment; the Notice of 
Appeal was filed. (Rec. 275). 
25. On June 20, 2007, Amy filed a Motion for Summary Disposition 
claiming that the Notice of Appeal wras untimely. This Court entered an Order July 7, 
2007, denying the Motion for Summary Disposition, stating that "[i]t is undisputed that 
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on May 17, 2007, within 30 days after the entry of an 
order denying a timely motion to set aside the judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure." Amy also sought summary disposition based upon an 
insubstantial question, which the Court deferred ruling on pending a plenary presentation 
and consideration of the appeal (See Order, dated July 7, 2007). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Scott's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was timely filed. This issue was 
already ruled on by this Court in its Order of July 7, 2007, denying Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Disposition. The Judgment appealed in this case was entered against Scott on 
May 7, 2004. (Rec. 45-46). On August 2, 2004, within 3 months, Scott filed a Motion to 
Set Aside the Judgment. (Rec.61). Therefore, the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was 
timely filed under Rule 60(b)(1), (2) or (3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Furthermore, a Judgment may be set aside for failure to give notice under 
Rule 74, pursuant to Rule 60(b) 's catch all provision, which does not have a 3 month time 
limitation. Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1984). 
Scott's Notice of Appeal was timely filed. This issue was also previously 
ruled on by this Court in its Order of July 7, 2007, denying Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Disposition. In February 2007, the trial court considered Scott's Motion to Set 
Aside the Judgment, and requested additional memoranda on the legal arguments. On 
March 12, 2007, Scott filed a Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment, based on Amy's failure to file a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel before 
proceeding against Scott in the action and obtaining a Judgment against him. 
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On April 18, 2007, Judge Faust issued his ruling on this issue by Minute 
Entry, finding that the notice provisions of Rule 74 do not apply in Scott's case. (Rec. 
271-273). On May 17, 2007, within 30 days of Judge Faust's ruling, Scott filed his Notice 
of Appeal. Therefore, the Notice of Appeal was timely filed pursuant to Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Res Judicata, under either issue preclusion or claim preclusion, does not bar 
the appeal in this case. Res judicata prevents a party from relitigating facts and issues by 
filing a second lawsuit, when the same facts and issues were fully litigated in the first 
lawsuit. Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842 (Utah 2004). Since there was no subsequent 
lawsuit filed, and this is still the first lawsuit, res judicata does not apply. Res judicata 
does not prohibit a party from appealing issues raised in the first lawsuit. 
Furthermore, res judicata requires that the first lawsuit be completely, fully 
and fairly litigated. The first lawsuit in this case was never completely, fully and fairly 
litigated, because the legal proceedings taken against Scott and the Judgment entered 
against him were improper, as notice was never given under Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. This Judgment is void; and the doctrine of res judicata does not apply. 
To rule otherwise would totally defeat the purpose of Rule 74, as opposing counsel would 
actually be encouraged to proceed against an unrepresented party and attempt to coerce a 
settlement, without giving proper notice under Rule 74; knowing that they can later defeat 
any challenge to their actions based on res judicata. 
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Moreover, res judicata cannot apply because the trial court did not enter its 
decision on Scott's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment based on Amy's failure to give him 
notice under Rule 74, until its Minute Entry of April 18, 2007. It was not until this time, 
that the trial court declared that Rule 74, and the notice requirements contained therein, 
do not apply to the facts in this case. This ruling was timely appealed. Therefore, neither 
res judicata nor law of the case prevents Scott from appealing this ruling. 
The Bankruptcy Court's actions do not bar Scott's appeal. Amy's 
bankruptcy was not before the trial court and it is not properly before this Court. Amy 
asks this Court to take judicial notice of Amy's bankruptcy for the first time on appeal. 
However, since this matter was never raised at the trial court level, it was not preserved, 
and cannot be argued for the first time on appeal. State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah 2002). 
Even if this Court's does consider Amy's bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy 
Court's Order Confirming Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan, contains no ruling or decision made 
by the Bankruptcy Court as to the validity of the alleged Confession of Judgment or 
whether it was appropriate for the trial court to proceed against Scott in violation of Rule 
74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Moreover, this Court has already ruled that the pendency of a bankruptcy 
case does not excuse a litigant from providing the required notice under Rule 74 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 699 
(UtApp. 1994). 
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An alleged contract does not preclude the notice requirements of Rule 74 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Amy argues that the Confession of Judgment is a 
valid enforceable contract. However, the Confession of Judgment was not prepared, 
filed, or ruled upon, until after Scott's attorney withdrew from the case, and without any 
notice being given or filed under Rule 74 to appear or appoint counsel. Rule 74 does not 
provide an exception to its notice provision for an alleged negotiated settlement or 
confession of judgment by a party without proper notice being given. Such an exception 
would be directly contrary to the purpose behind the notice requirements of Rule 74, as it 
would encourage opposing counsel to coerce a settlement, or confession of judgment, 
from an unrepresented party, before giving the requisite notice. 
Furthermore, whether there was a negotiated settlement or confession of 
judgment in this case (which Scott disputes), raises factual issues; and a determination of 
these facts by the court against Scott constitutes "further proceedings" in the case against 
Scott in violation of Rule 74. Therefore, any finding by the court that the Confession of 
Judgment was a valid, enforceable contract, to enter Judgment against Scott on May 7, 
2004, is a further proceeding in violation of Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The mandate in Rule 74 is clear. It does not offer the trial court discretion. 
It certainly does not allow the trial court to proceed to adjudicate issues and make a 
determination as to whether a valid contract was subsequently entered into by a party, 
particularly confessing judgment, when the requisite notice has not being given. 
10 
Opposing counsel must give notice under Rule 74, before opposing counsel or the court 
may initiate or conduct any further proceedings against the party. Hartford Leasing Corp. 
v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 700 (Ut.App. 1994). Adjudicating facts to determine the legality 
of a contract, or a confession of judgment, constitutes "any further proceedings," which is 
prohibited under Rule 74 when the requisite notice to appear or appoint counsel has not 
been filed. 
No personal appearance was made to waive the notice requirement of Rule 
74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Amy argues for the first time on appeal, that the 
alleged Confession of Judgment constitutes a personal appearance by Scott, and therefore, 
the notice requirement of Rule 74 does not apply. However, this issue was never raised 
before the trial court and Judge Faust did not rule on this in his decision. (Rec. 272). 
Since this issue was never raised at the trial court level, it was not preserved, and cannot 
be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah 2002). 
Furthermore, this Court has already held, that while a party may waive the 
right to contest jurisdiction by a general appearance, this is entirely different than the 
requirement to give notice under Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Hartford 
Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694 (Ut.App. 1994). 
There is no question but that Scott entered a personal appearance in the case 
with his Answer. However, his personal appearance in the case, does not mean that he is 
not entitled to notice under Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, when his 
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attorney later withdraws from his case. Id. 
The cases cited by Amy in her brief regarding a personal appearance do not 
deal with the requirement to give notice under Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Although some deal with the right to receive notice under local rules before a 
default is entered against a party; these cases support Scott's position, holding that if an 
appearance has been made, notice must be given. Accordingly, Scott should have 
received notice under Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Finally, it is clear from the record that Scott is not the one who filed the 
alleged Confession of Judgment, and he has maintained throughout the case, that he never 
agreed to the terms set forth therein, or knew that the page he signed was part of a larger 
Confession of Judgment document, to be filed with the court. Therefore, the alleged 
execution of the Confession of Judgment, and the filing of the Confession of Judgment 
with the court, cannot be deemed as a voluntary act by Scott to enter his personal 
appearance in the case. 
Further proceedings were taken against Scott in this case. Amy argues that 
further proceedings were not taken against Scott, however, it is clear from the record that 
further proceedings were taken against Scott in this case, both by Amy's counsel and the 
trial court. A Confession of Judgment was prepared and filed by Amy's counsel, 
allegedly pursuant to Rule 58A(f). Furthermore, a Motion for Order to Show Cause was 
filed by Amy, along with additional evidence contained in her Affidavit. A hearing on 
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the Motion for Order to Show Cause was held and granted by the court. The court also 
entered Scott's default, and subsequently entered a money Judgment against Scott based 
on the alleged Confession of Judgment, Scott's default, the evidence presented, and the 
statements of counsel. (Rec. 45). Such actions by Amy and the court clearly constitute 
"further proceedings" in the action, which are prohibited without first giving notice under 
Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPEAL OF THE COURT'S RULING, ENTERED 
APRIL 18,2007, INTERPRETING RULE 74 U.R.CIV.P. 
WAS TIMELY FILED ON MAY 17, 2007. 
Judge Faust's ruling interpreting Rule 74 U.R.Civ.P.; and his determination 
that the notice provision of Rule 74 does not apply to the facts in this case, distinguishing 
this case from Loporto v. Hoegemann, 982 P.2d 586 (Ut.App. 1999), did not occur until 
his Minute Entry of April 18, 2007. Within 30 days Scott filed his Notice of Appeal on 
May 17, 2007; thus the Notice of Appeal was timely filed in this case. Furthermore, this 
Court has already ruled, after reviewing the file in this case, that based on these facts, the 
Notice of Appeal was timely filed. (See Order, dated July 7, 2007). 
A. Respondent's 60(b) Motion was Timely Filed. 
After Scott's attorney filed her first Notice of Withdrawal on October 31, 
2003; without any Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel being filed, Amy proceeded 
against Scott by filing an alleged Confession of Judgment on December 5,2003. Amy 
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further proceeded by filing a Motion for Order to Show Cause, with her affidavit, in 
February 2004. The Order to Show Cause hearing was held and the Motion was granted 
in April 2004. The Judgment against Scott was entered on May 7, 2004. (Rec. 45-46). 
On August 2, 2004, within 3 months of the May 7, 2004 Judgment, Scott's 
attorney, Wendy J. Lems, reentered her appearance and filed a Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment. (Rec. 61). Therefore, Scott did timely file a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment 
entered against him on May 7, 2004. This Court has already ruled, after reviewing the 
file in this case, that based on these facts, the Motion to Set Aside Judgment was timely 
filed. (See Order, dated July 7, 2007). 
Furthermore, regardless of the 3 month time period, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that a judgment entered in violation of Rule 74 is void, and may be set 
aside under Rule 60(b)'s catch all provision, which does not have a 3 month time 
limitation. Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1984). 
B. An Error in the Law is Grounds to Set Aside a Judgment. 
Under Rule 60(b)(l)-(3) U.R.Civ.P., a judgment can be set aside when there 
has been mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, 
or fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party. If a judgment is 
sought to be set aside under one of these reasons it must be brought within 3 months after 
the judgment is entered. As stated above, and as ruled by this Court, the Motion to Set 
Aside in this case, was filed within 3 months after the Judgment was entered. 
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However, Rule 60(b) also allows a judgment to be set aside if (4) the 
judgment is void, (5) it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application, or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, 
including an error in the law rendering the judgment void. As stated above, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that a judgment entered in violation of Rule 74 is void, and may 
be set aside under Rule 60(b)'s catch all provision. Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581, 583 
(Utah 1984). 
The Judgment entered in this case on May 7, 2004, is based on "further 
proceedings" taken against Scott in violation of Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; therefore, the Judgment is void and should be set aside under Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Failure to give notice under Rule 74 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure before proceeding against an opposing party, has rendered other 
judgments void in the past. See Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1984) 
(summary judgment void); ProMaxDev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 251-252 
(Ut.App. 1997)(entry of judgment void); Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 
699 (Ut.App. 1994). 
As far as a meritorious defense is concerned, when a judgment is void there 
is no requirement to show a meritorious defense. Id. See also Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 
288, 290 (Utah 1986). Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court in Sperry v. Smith, did not 
require the showing of a meritorious defense to vacate the judgment, but made it clear 
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that once a notice of withdrawal has been filed, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to allow opposing counsel to proceed, or for the court to proceed, before the 
requisite notice is given under Rule 74. Sperry v. Smith, supra, at 583. Moreover, to 
show a meritorious defense a party need only proffer a defense to the judgment. Lund v. 
Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000). The purpose of the meritorious defense rule is "to 
prevent the necessity of judicial review of questions which, on the face of the pleadings, 
are frivolous." Id. at 283. 
In this case, Scott filed an Answer in the divorce action and also argued that 
he never saw or agreed to the terms set forth in the alleged Confession of Judgment. 
Therefore, Scott has raised a meritorious defense to the Judgment entered against him. 
Furthermore, since this is a divorce action dealing with the division of the parties' marital 
property, there is no question but that Scott has an interest in the property; and his claims, 
or defenses in this case, cannot be deemed as frivolous. 
Amy argues that there was no mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect and that Scott failed to act with due diligence. However, as stated above, Scott 
does not need to show mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, to have the 
Judgment vacated for failure to give notice under Rule 74. Id. 
Furthermore, Scott is not required to act with due diligence until the proper 
notice is filed and received under Rule 74. In Hartford v. State, supra, the trial court 
granted the State's motion to dismiss, although no notice was given to appear or appoint 
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new counsel. On appeal, the State argued that although it did not comply with the rule, 
the violation was remedied because four years had passed and plaintiff had plenty of time 
to obtain new counsel, but failed to proceed with due diligence. This argument was 
rejected on appeal by this Court. This Court concluded that the plain language of Rule 74 
precluded the State from filing its motion to dismiss without first giving the required 
notice to appear or appoint counsel. Id. at 699. 
II. THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICA TA & LAW OF THE 
CASE DO NOT APPLY TO THE APPEAL IN HIS CASE 
Res judicata prevents parties or privies from relitigating facts and issues in 
a second suit that were fully litigated in the first suit. Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842 
(Utah 2004). Therefore, res judicata prohibits the refiling of a second lawsuit to relitigate 
the same issues decided in the first lawsuit. Id. Since this is still the first lawsuit, res 
judicata does not apply, under either issue preclusion or claim preclusion.2 Res Judicata 
should not be used as a bar to prohibit a party from appealing issues that are properly 
raised in the first lawsuit, as in this case. 
Furthermore, res judicata requires that the first lawsuit be completely, fully 
and fairly litigated. Scott on his appeal in this case, is claiming that this case, i.e. the first 
2The claim preclusion arm of res judicata prohibits a claim from being brought in a 
second action; when it could and should, have been raised in the first action. Snyder v. 
Murray City Corp., 73 P.3d 325 (Utah 2003). Since this is still the first action, claim 
preclusion does not apply to the issues properly raised in this action. 
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lawsuit, was not completely, fully and fairly litigated, because the proceedings taken 
against him, and the Judgment entered against him, were improper because there was 
never any Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel filed with the court pursuant to Rule 74 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, making the Judgment void. Thus, the doctrine of 
res judicata, or law of the case, does not apply to the appeal in this case. 
To rule otherwise would defeat the purpose of Rule 74 and lead to 
unfavorable results. For instance, if it can be argued that the notice requirements of Rule 
74 can be waived or superceded by the principles of res judicata or law of the case, then 
parties and their counsel will actually be encouraged to proceed in the action to coerce a 
settlement or confession from an unrepresented party, without giving the requisite notice, 
knowing that they will be able to argue later that their actions cannot be challenged based 
on res judicata or law of the case, although the action was taken in violation of Rule 74. 
Moreover, res judicata cannot apply in this case because the trial court did 
not enter its decision regarding Scott's Motion to Set Aside Judgment based on Amy's 
failure to give notice under Rule 74, until Judge Faust's Minute Entry of April 18, 2007. 
It was not until this time, that the trial court declared that Rule 74, and the notice 
requirements contained therein, did not apply to the facts in this case, and the trial court 
attempted to distinguish this case from Loporto v. Hoegernann, 982 P.2d 586 (Ut.App. 
1999). This was the only decision made by the trial court on this issue. This was not a 
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matter ruled upon by Judge Roth in his Judgment of August 9, 2005.3 After Judge Faust's 
Minute Entry in April of 2007, his decision was timely appealed. Therefore res judicata 
should not prevent Scott from timely appealing Judge Faust's decision on this issue. 
III. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S ACTIONS DO NOT 
EFFECT THE APPEAL IN THIS CASE. 
Amy's bankruptcy was not argued before the trial court, and it is not 
properly before this Court. The trial court did not rely on any bankruptcy rulings or 
orders in considering the validity of the Confession of Judgment, the Motion to Set Aside 
the Judgment, or the requirement to give notice under Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (Rec. 271-273). However, Amy asks the appellate court to take judicial notice 
of Amy's bankruptcy in order to argue for the first time on appeal that it supports the trial 
court's decision in this case. However, since this matter was never raised or argued before 
the trial court, it was not properly preserved, and cannot be argued for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah 2002). The preservation rule applies to every 
claim, even constitutional questions, unless it can be shown that plain error or exceptional 
circumstances exist. Id. There has been no claim of plain error, or exceptional 
circumstances in this case. 
3The matter before Judge Roth was an Objection to Garnishment (Reel 12 & 114). 
Judge Roth denied the Motion to Set Aside the Garnishment (Rec. 117). The Judgment 
entered was in connection with the Wnt of Garnishment served on May 18,2005. (Rec. 
118-119). 
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Even if this Court's does consider Amy's bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy 
Court's Order Confirming Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan doesn't contain any ruling or 
decision made by the Bankruptcy Court as to the validity of the alleged Confession of 
Judgment or whether it was appropriate for the trial court to proceed against Scott in 
violation of Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plan simply provides that 
any funds collected under judgment(s) against Scott Migilore shall be immediately paid to 
the trustee. This is not sufficient to have any affect on the issues appealed in this case and 
the requirement to give notice under Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Moreover, this Court has already held that the pendency of a bankruptcy 
case does not excuse a litigant from providing the required notice under Rule 74 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 699 
(Ut.App. 1994). 
IV. AN ALLEGED CONTRACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE 
NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 74 U.R.CIV.P. 
Amy argues that there was a meeting of the minds at the parties' mediation 
and that the Confession of Judgment is a valid enforceable contract. However, the 
Mediation Agreement entered into by the parties specifically provides, that, "the parties 
understand and acknowledge that any agreement reached in the mediation session is only 
tentative pending review of the agreement by the parties' attorneys and does not 
constitute a contract, unless otherwise specifically entered into by the parties." (Rec. 220). 
It cannot be disputed that this was never done in this case. Scott's attorney withdrew 
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before there was any agreement drafted for her to review; and the alleged Confession of 
Judgment was not prepared until after she withdrew. (Rec. 32). 
Amy next argues that there was a meeting of the minds regarding the 
Confession of Judgment. However, this is disputed by Scott. Scott has maintained 
throughout this action that he never agreed to the terms in the Confession of Judgment 
that was filed or knew that such a document was going to be filed in the case.4 This at a 
minimum, raises factual issues regarding the execution of the alleged Confession of 
Judgment, its enforceability, and its filing. Amy even submitted the Affidavit of Charlet 
Walk to address these factual issues. However, regardless of the truth of these factual 
issues, it is undisputed that the Confession of Judgment was prepared and filed by Amy's 
counsel without any Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel having ever been filed in the 
case. Therefore, any claim that the trial court found the Confession of Judgment to be a 
valid, enforceable contract, to grant the Motion for Order to Show Cause, to enter Scott's 
default, and to subsequently enter a money Judgment against Scott in May of 2004, is 
improper, as such adjudication and determination of these facts by the court, without 
notice being filed under Rule 74, clearly constitutes "further proceedings" in the action, in 
4Amy claims that the filing of the Confession of Judgment was a voluntary act by 
Scott. However, the record is clear that Scott did not file the Confession of Judgment. It 
was prepared and filed by Amy's counsel. (Rec. 34-36). Furthermore, Scott has 
maintained throughout this action that he never received, reviewed, or agreed to the terms 
contained in the Confession of Judgment, or knew that such a document was going to be 
filed with the court. (Rec. 59, 158, 181-183). This filing was not a voluntary act by Scott. 
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violation of Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The mandate in Rule 74 is clear. The Rule provides that the opposing 
counsel must give notice under Rule 74, before opposing counsel or the court may initiate 
or conduct any further proceedings against the other party. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. 
State, 888 P.2d 694, 700 (Ut.App. 1994). It does not offer the trial court any discretion. 
It certainly does not allow the trial court discretion to adjudicate factual disputes, and to 
determine whether or not a valid contract was subsequently entered into in settlement of a 
case, as a confession of judgment, or for any other purpose. This constitutes further 
proceedings in the action; and notice must be given before the court may initiate or 
conduct any further proceedings. Id. at 700. 
V. THERE WAS NO PERSONAL APPEARANCE TO WAIVE 
THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 74 U.R.CIV.P. 
Amy argues for the first time on appeal, that the alleged Confession of 
Judgment constitutes a general personal appearance by Scott. However, this argument 
was never raised before the trial court, and the trial court never ruled on this issue. (Rec. 
271-273). Since this argument was not previously raised before the trial court, it was not 
preserved, and Amy cannot make this argument for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Cram, 46 P.3d 230 (Utah 2002). 
Furthermore, as stated above, the Confession of Judgment was prepared and 
filed by Amy's counsel, not by Scott (Rec 34-36); and Scott has contested that he ever 
received, reviewed or agreed to the terms contained in the Confession of Judgment. He 
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also contends that he never knew that the paper he signed was going to be filed with the 
court, or that it was part of a larger document, or a Confession of Judgment, to be filed 
with the court. (Rec. 59, 158,181-183). Therefore, the preparation, execution, and filing 
of the Confession of Judgment with the court by Amy's counsel, cannot be deemed as a 
voluntary act by Scott to make a personal appearance in the case. 
Moreover, while a party may waive the right to contest jurisdiction by a 
general personal appearance, jurisdiction over a party is entirely different than the 
requirement to give notice under Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Hartford 
Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694 (Ut.App. 1994). There is no question but that Scott 
had entered an appearance in the case with his Answer. However, the fact he had entered 
an appearance by answering the Complaint, does not mean that he is not entitled to notice 
under Rule 74, when his attorney later withdraws from his case. Id. 
The cases cited by Amy in her brief regarding personal appearances do not 
deal with the requirement to give notice under Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Some of the cases deal with personal jurisdiction, and some deal with the 
right to receive notice under local rules, before a default is entered against a party, who 
has made an appearance in the case. However, these cases support Scott's position in this 
case, holding that if an appearance is made, notice must be given under the local rules, 
before default is entered. Accordingly, notice should have been given to Scott in this 
case, pursuant to Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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VI. THE OPPOSING PARTY AND THE TRAIL COURT BOTH 
TOOK FURTHER PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SCOTT IN 
VIOLATION OF RULE 74 U.R.CIV.P. 
Amy argues that further proceedings were not taken against Scott, however, 
it is clear from the record that further proceedings were taken against Scott, both by 
Amy's counsel and the trial court. A Confession of Judgment was prepared and filed 
with the Court by Amy's counsel, allegedly in accordance with Rule 58A(f) U.R.Civ.P. 
(Rec. 34-36); a Motion for Order to Show Cause was filed with the court, submitted with 
facts contained in an affidavit from Amy. (Rec. 37-40). A hearing was held on the 
Motion for Order to Show Cause and the Motion was granted and Scott's default entered. 
(Rec. 44). Subsequently a Judgment was entered against Scott based on the alleged 
Confession of Judgment, the Motion for Order to Show Cause, Scott's failure to appear, 
the evidence presented, and the statements of counsel. (Rec. 45-46). These actions are 
clearly "further proceedings" in the action, taken against Scott in violation of Rule 74 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 74 is explicit in providing that, "No further proceedings shall be held 
in a case until 20 days after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel." There was 
never any Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel filed in this case. Therefore, both the 
opposing counsel and the trial court, by their above actions, violated Rule 74 by 
proceeding against Scott in the case without the filing of a Notice to Appear or Appoint 
Counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
Judge Faust abused his discretion in not vacating the Order and Judgment 
entered against Scott in violation of Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 
74 does not provide an exception nor does it give discretion to the court, to determine if 
an alleged contractual agreement was subsequently entered into by the parties, if such a 
contract was understood or agreed to by the parties, or if the contract was later violated by 
one of the parties. The trial court's only option after a notice of withdrawal is filed is to 
stay any further proceedings until the requirements of Rule 74 are fulfilled. Loporto v. 
Hoegemann, 982 P.2d 586 (Ut.App. 1999). 
Loporto v. Hoegemann is controlling in this case. The claim that a contract 
was entered into after a notice of withdrawal was filed, but before any Notice to Appear 
or Appoint Counsel was filed under Rule 74, does not invalidate the notice requirements 
of Rule 74. It does not allow the court to proceed to adjudicate such a claim, and it does 
not distinguish the case from Loporto v. Hoegemann. Id. 
The opposing party and the trial court wrongfully continued with "further 
proceedings"against Scott, by entering orders, by entering Scott's default, and by entering 
Judgment against Scott, in violation of Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Therefore, the Confession of Judgment should be held invalid, the Order granting the 
Motion for Order to Show Cause and entering Scott's default should be vacated, and the 
subsequent Judgment entered against Scott should be found void, and should be vacated. 
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DATED this / / day of January, 2008. 
BOND & CALL L.C. 
TCafl 
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